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1
INTRODUCTION
It is apparent that progress is being made in
developing national and international protection
mechanisms for safeguarding traditional knowledge
systems and respecting the norms and practices of
local communities. While the Nagoya Protocol on
Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their
Utilisation to the Convention on Biological
Diversity (Nagoya Protocol) respects the rights of
indigenous and local communities relating to the
access and benefit sharing provisions of the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), there is
still reason for concern as to what extent the voices
of indigenous peoples are sufficiently and accurately
represented in the final text of the Nagoya Protocol.
This point of critique relates to a wider debate about
how to incorporate non-Western legal systems into
the dominant legal jurisprudence. Recent decisions
of the United States Supreme Court ruled that tribal
jurisdictions are not enforceable when non-natives
are involved.1 Consequently, some scholars question
the relevance and the pragmatic utility of recognising
or developing customary laws to protect cultural
property if those laws will be unenforceable outside
the jurisdiction of indigenous peoples or the region
of origin.2 The problem of limits on enforcing tribal
law is another manifestation of the laws institutional
response to the paradox brought about by the global
movement for social justice.
The issue of protecting traditional knowledge and
genetic resources is a textbook example of a legal
problem in a world of hybrid legal spaces where a
single problem, act or actor is regulated by multiple
legal regimes. Unmistakingly, the Nagoya Protocol
deserves credit for formally recognising community
protocols and customary laws as noted in Article
12 (1):
In implementing their obligations under this
Protocol, Parties shall in accordance with
domestic law take into consideration
indigenous and local communities
customary laws, community protocols and
procedures, as applicable, with respect to
traditional knowledge associated with genetic
resources.
The explicit reference to customary law is a clear
sign that international environmental law is ready
to acknowledge that the issue of protecting
traditional knowledge cannot escape a tiered system
of laws  international, national and customary. On
an international but rather abstract level, the Nagoya
Protocol promises to protect the resources and
knowledge of indigenous peoples in accordance with
the worldviews and norms of indigenous and local
communities. The jury is still out and only time will
tell whether the Nagoya Protocol can keep up its
promises on the ground. In the mean time this article
explores the challenges we face in this brave new
world of cosmopolitan legality. The concept of
cosmopolitan legality or subaltern cosmopolitanism
refers to the work of de Soussa Santos who is
interested in theorising counter-hegemonic
globalisation movements in the global South.3 The
purpose of this concept is to expose the potential
and the limitations of the law-centred strategies for
the advancement of counter-hegemonic struggles in
the context of globalisation. It encourages the
subaltern, such as indigenous peoples, to speak in
the global arena and to accept their speech as law, a
law that is an amalgam of United Nations
resolutions, national law, local norms and customs.4
While law can indeed be used as a tool to provide
domination and resistance (sometimes even
simultaneously), based on observations in the field
through work with the San peoples on the Hoodia
benefit sharing agreement,5 this article resides itself
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1 See, for example, State v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,
459 (1997). For more details see Angela R. Riley, Straight
Stealing: Towards an Indigenous System of Cultural
Property 80 Washington Law Review 69 (2005).
2 See, Riley, Id.
3 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal
Common Sense: Law, Globalisation and Emancipation
(London: Reed Elsevier (UK) Ltd, 2nd ed. 2002).
4 Naomi Johnstone, Indonesia in the REDD: Climate
Change, Indigenous Peoples and Global Legal Pluralism
12/1 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 93 (2010-2011).
5 For more details about the Hoodia benefit sharing
agreement, see R. Chennells, Traditional Knowledge and
Benefit Sharing after the Nagoya Protocol:  Three Cases
from South Africa, published in this issue of LEAD Journal.
with the critical socio-legal scholars who have taken
it in their stride to show how legal institutions may
lend authority to certain interpretations while
denying status to others.6
What this article seeks to do is to recreate the
experience of life on the bottom.7 This requires
listening to the voice of those who have suffered
oppression and discrimination and to put critical
in front of the concept of legal pluralism. While legal
pluralism valorises non-state actors as norm
generating communities, by according these
alternative discourses a similar power as the legal
discourse of the State, legal pluralism has been
criticised for continuing to use state law and the rule
of law as the normative norm against which other
norms are measured and allowed. Critical legal
pluralism creates a platform that incorporates a
heterogeneous group of legal subjects; it allows
interpretations and narratives of the law beyond the
official ones.8
Drawing parallels between access and benefit sharing
agreements and native title claims allows this article
to identify the problems that can arise when Western
jurisprudence translates customary laws cross-
culturally. The challenges that indigenous peoples
are facing in native title claims can show how
Western law interprets traditional law and customs
and can be used as a benchmark to anticipate the
problems indigenous peoples and local communities
will encounter when Article 12 (1) of the Nagoya
Protocol will be applied on the ground. The history
of recognition of aboriginal rights in Canada is in
particular useful. Section 35 (1) of the Canadian
Constitution recognises and affirms the existing
Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal
peoples of Canada. However, giving meaning to
terms such as existing, recognised and affirmed
has caused debate and the only institution that has
real power to interpret the meaning and significance
of Section 35(1) is the Supreme Court of Canada.9
A number of major cases in Aboriginal law in
Canada (some of which will be discussed in more
detail in this article) have shed further light on how
Aboriginal legal theory has evolved in Canadian law.
Aboriginal rights are now firmly accepted as
constitutional rights and subsequently are embedded
in Canadian law and politics. However, indigenous
peoples of Canada still find it unacceptable that their
rights are only legitimate within the legal and
political contours of the Canadian state. They defend
their rights through the concept of Aboriginal
nationhood and question the sovereignty of the
Canadian state over their lands.10 The issue of state
sovereignty is also at stake in the Nagoya Protocol
and indigenous peoples argue that state sovereignty
overrules their prior rights. Canada has indeed a long
history of dealing with indigeneity in its courts and
hence provides a useful benchmark to question
within the context of the Nagoya Protocol to what
extent laws and customs of indigenous peoples will
be recognised as providing evidence of ownership.
What native title claims and the Nagoya Protocol
have in common is that both are examples of
complex interrelationships between different legal
orders.11 Native title claims in Canada are a testing
ground to explore the potential of enforceability of
plural legal orders in the Nagoya Protocol. Before
native title claims will be discussed in more detail,
the article will first provide a wider background of
the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement and the
Nagoya Protocol. The final part of the article will
explore from a theoretical point of view why
customary law is being excluded or misinterpretated
in Western courts.
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6 Rosemary Coombe and Jonathan Cohen, The Law and
Late Modern Culture: Reflections on Between Facts and
Norms from the Perspective of Critical Cultural Legal
Studies 76 Denver University Law Review 1029 (1998-
1999).
7 Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal
Studies and Reparations 22 Harvard Civil Rights  Civil
Liberties Law Review 323 (1987).
8 Martha-Marie Klenhans, What is Critical Legal
Pluralism? 12/2 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 25
(1997).
9 Dale Turner, This is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical
Indigenous Philosophy (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2006).
10 Id.
11 Elisa Morgera, Bilateralism at the Service of Community
Interests? Non-Judicial Enforcement of Global Public
Goods in the Context of Global Environmental Law
23/3 The European Journal of International Law 743
(2012).
2
SETTING THE SCENE
The San Hoodia agreement illustrates the potential
conflict of legal orders in access and benefit sharing
agreements. The San are one of the most ancient
populations on the planet. Remains of their ancestors
date back some 12,000 years in their present
homelands. Today there are nearly 99,000 San living
in Namibia, Botswana, and South Africa, with
smaller numbers remaining in Angola, Zambia and
Zimbabwe. Only a very small number of San groups
still follow their traditional hunting and gathering
life. The vast majority live in extreme poverty in
villages, practicing a mixed economy, or attached
to Bantu villages and cattle posts, or working on
commercial farms and ranches, or in government
resettlement camps. The San peoples of the Kalahari
Desert have a long history of chewing Hoodia as a
water and food substitute. A patent was awarded to
South Africas Council for Scientific Industrial
Research (CSIR) in 1998 without the consent of the
San peoples. After some campaigning the San signed
a benefit sharing agreement with the CSIR. The
Hoodia benefit sharing agreement has often been
applauded as a major step forward in the recognition
of the knowledge of indigenous peoples and it is seen
as a mechanism that can provide social justice.
However, when the Sans history of Hoodia is
recorded within the context of the benefit sharing
agreement and the CBD, it becomes positivistic and
its life force is translated in a discourse of property
rights and economic value.12 When the Sans oral
stories and narratives entered the marketplace of
ideas,13 original stories of cosmologies and
sharing14 were translated into stories of science and
exclusive property rights.15 The cosmologies of the
San remained confined to the red sand dunes of the
Kalahari. The legal regime of the CBD only
recognised the rhetorics of the powerful  the elite
 and rejected the stories of the dissidents or those
who contested the Hoodia benefit sharing
agreement. The opponents of the Hoodia benefit
sharing agreement were confronted with a legal
regime that rejected the stories of outsiders. This
article will draw attention to why some of the
dissenting narratives and stories remain hidden from
international environmental law.
The CBD has as one of its objectives the fair and
equitable sharing of the benefits derived from the
utilisation of genetic resources. To implement this
objective, the Nagoya Protocol was adopted at the
tenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to
the CBD (COP 10), held in Nagoya, Japan from 18-
29 October 2010. The most important remit of the
Nagoya Protocol was to deal with the criticisms that
were aired against access and benefit sharing
provisions in the CBD. The basic reproach has been
that the CBD is mostly concerned with assuring
access to and sharing the benefits of genetic resources
and little has been achieved in terms of providing
Law, Environment and Development Journal
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12 Saskia Vermeylen, Law as a Narrative: Legal Pluralism
and Resisting Euro-American (Intellectual) Property Law
Through Stories 61 Journal of Legal Pluralism 55 (2010).
13 Chris Preston, A Past of Tragic Stories: The (Non-)
Treatment of Native Peoples Oral Histories in Canada
2/1 Undercurrent 54 (2005).
14 As the author has argued elsewhere (see Vermeylen, note
12 above), the Sans customs with regard to property and
benefit sharing can be found in some of their stories
usually associated with conflicts between iconic animals
(hyenas, jackals and lions) and their fights over food.
Stories about the importance of sharing of food - told
through the reporting of mischiefs that happens to the
animals if in their quest for food others are excluded or
get killed  give insights into basic values that order San
life. What these stories so aptly show is that for the San
sharing is not only an economic principle; the string
ethics of sharing food are part of a wider social network
that can only exist when strong ethics guide the socio-
economic relationship in the community.
15 As the author has illustrated with extracts from interviews
recorded during fieldwork with the Khomani San in June
2004 and July 2007, a discourse of exclusive ownership
rights is widely used and embedded in the rhetorics of
the community members when discussing traditional
knowledge in general and Hoodia in particular. This
contrasts with some of the narratives used by those
community members who do not belong to the elite or
who were not part of the Hoodia benefit sharing
negotiations. For detailed extracts, see Vermeylen, note
12 above.
adequate protection for the traditional knowledge
and well being of indigenous peoples.16 While the
CBD emphasises state sovereignty over territory or
the fruits of private invention, for indigenous peoples
these resources are part of their right to self-
determination and rights to heritage and property.17
The adoption of the Nagoya Protocol is seen as a
milestone in the recognition of the rights of
indigenous peoples, nevertheless giving all control
over natural resources to the state severely limits
the control of indigenous peoples and local
communities over their natural resources and
ecosystems. One of the main criticisms against the
Nagoya Protocol is the vagueness and obfuscating
language that is used whenever it refers to the rights
of indigenous peoples and local communities. Article
12 (1) is a good illustration of the double standard
when it specifies that Parties shall only take
customary law into account in accordance with
domestic law.18 This raises the issue to what extent
customary law will be taken into account. Learning
from past experiences when the law is confronted
with a site of struggle will help to unravel the extent
of implementation challenges that the Nagoya
Protocol is facing. In particular, this article is
interested in exploring to what extent the law will
be prepared to allow multiple narratives and stories
as evidence of ownership with regard to traditional
knowledge and genetic resources.
3
NARRATIVES AND THE LAW
Indigenous law originates in the rich stories,
ceremonies and traditions of indigenous peoples.
Narratives and stories play a dominant role in the
way elders reveal to the younger generation the
deeper meanings of order and disorder in their
community. Stories and narratives act indeed as
normative lawmaking sources.
Stories and storytelling are central components in
discourses that represent history, memory and
particular places. Increasingly, narratives have
become an important and recurring theme in legal
scholarship, but this is not surprising because law
has always been concerned with narratives. To put
it bluntly in the words of Scheppele:
in law all courts have is stories [.] judges
and jurors are not witness to the events at
issue; they are witness to stories about the
events.19
However, only some stories are accepted and other
stories are rejected even though the latter might be
more accurate versions of the event.
The power of narrative in constituting social
relations is one that has been acknowledged
by a number of disciplines, including law.
Narrative endorses a multiplicity of forms
from a diverse range of sources. But regardless
of the form they are given, a key issue is
always the basis upon which narratives are
accorded recognition, or denied legitimacy.
A second focal question asks how they are
situated with respect to other narratives and
the type of authority that they command.20
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16 Katharina Rogalla Von Bieberstein and Konstantia
Koutouki, The Nagoya Protocol: Status of Indigenous
and Local Communities (Montreal: Centre for
International Sustainable Development Law (CISDL),
Legal Aspects of Sustainable Natural Resources Legal
Working Paper Series, 2011), available at http://cisdl.org/
public/docs/legal/The%20Nagoya%20Protocol%20-
%20Status%20of%20Indiginous%20and%20Local%
20Communities.pdf.
17 Elisa Morgera and Elsa Tsioumani, Yesterday, Today,
and Tomorrow: Looking Afresh at the Convention on
Biological Diversity 21/1 Yearbook of International
Environmental Law 3 (2010).
18 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
80th Session 13 Feb - 9 March 2012 UN, Geneva. Response
to Canadas 19th and 20th Periodic Reports: Alternative
report on Canadas Actions on the Nagoya Protocol
(2012), Joint Report by the Grand Council of the Cress,
Assembly of First Nations and many others, available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/
ngos/NGOs_Nagoya_Protocol_Canada_CERD80.pdf.
19 Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories 87
Michigan Law Review 2073 (1989).
20 Anne Griffiths, Doing Ethnography: Living Law, Life
Histories, and Narratives from Botswana, in June Starr
and Mark Goodale eds, Practicing Ethnography in Law:
New Dialogues, Enduring Methods 160 (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
For the plaintiffs, on the other hand, the Masphee
story was one of coercion, adaptation and survival.
The Masphee people had moved casually, and
sometimes invisibly between Indian and non-Indian
life. The hybrid identity of the Masphee people made
it possible for them to survive. At the end of the trial,
the jury rejected the story of the Masphee people.
Despite such legal setbacks, the recognition of the
importance of narratives in legal settings has
encouraged indigenous peoples to use narratives
when negotiating land claims - and increasingly with
some success. In the Delgamuukw ruling,27 the
Supreme Court of Canada has accepted oral histories
of indigenous peoples as legal evidence in aboriginal
rights cases. But as Fiske28 warns, there is a danger
that storytelling will become embedded in the
politics of difference as soon as the courts start to
absorb the narratives of indigenous peoples into their
own legal discourses. Only those stories that are
framed in the English language of self governance,
aboriginal rights and co-management are recognised
by the courts but this is the language of the dominant
society, the language of the policy makers.29 Stories
that emphasise another way of knowing are
dismissed as different, and the social position of the
storytellers is reduced to being an outsider.
This throws up the issue to what extent the law
distorts narratives when it starts to incorporate and
translate cultural differences in its jurisprudence.
Lessons can be learned from the critical (legal)
literature that questions the nature of the difference
that is recognised in aboriginal rights claims in
general and native title claims in particular.30
Formal law recognises a narrative that is embodied
in legislation and judicial decision-making, and
increasingly other narratives of lawmaking challenge
this essentialist form of lawmaking.21 Narratives have
entered legal studies as a vehicle to contest traditional
forms of legal reasoning and argumentation.22 Marginalised
and excluded groups can use storytelling to make their
voices heard and to contest formal legal judgments.23
However, legal accounts tend to adopt the stories of
those who are privileged and expel the stories and
experiences of people of colour, the poor, women
and those who cannot describe their experience in
the positivistic language of the law.24 Those whose
stories are rejected before the law become outsiders
because they are judged to have a different history,
a different set of background experience and a
different set of understandings than insiders. Insiders
perceive the outsiders as bizarre and strange and
indeed primitive when the outsiders represent their
stories to the legal establishment  the insiders.
Nowhere is this practice so familiar as within the
context of indigenous peoples and their quest to gain
sovereign and self-determination rights.
In Masphee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp,25 Indian
witnesses were interrogated about their identity and
belonging to the Masphee tribe. The ultimate
question in this case was whether the Masphee tribe
existed and whether this tribe could be party to a
lawsuit. In the critical legal literature,26 the trial has
become an illustration of a conflict between two
narratives of Indian history. The opposing sides held
different images of tribal status, culture and identity.
The trial exposed a disjunction between legal and
ethnographic identities. The defendants relied on
written history, the archive, to develop categorical
definitions of a tribe. The defendants showed that
the so-called Masphee tribe was not a distinct tribe at
all, but instead consisted of a loose composition of
refugees from several other tribes and ethnic groups.
Law, Environment and Development Journal
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21 Id.
22 Peter Brooks and Paul D. Gewirtz, Laws Stories:
Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1996).
23 Id.
24 See Scheppele, note 19 above.
25 Masphee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp, 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir. 1979).
26 Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg, Cultural Criticism
of Law 49 Stanford Law Review 1149 (1997).
27 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010.
28 Jo-Anne Fiske, Positioning the Legal Subject and the
Anthropologist: The Challenge of Delgamuuwk to
Anthropological Theory 45 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1 (2000).
29 Julie Cruikshank, Oral Traditions and Material Culture:
Multiplying Meanings of Words and Things 8/3
Anthropology Today 5 (1992) and Julie Cruikshank,
Negotiating with Narrative: Establishing Cultural
Identity at the Yukon International Storytelling Festival
99 American Anthropologist 56 (1997).
30 Brenna Bhandar, Re-Covering the Limits of Recognition:
The Politics of Difference and Decolonisation in John
Borrows Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous
Law 27 Australian Feminist Law Journal 125 (2007) and
John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of
Indigenous Law (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2002).
4
ORAL EVIDENCE IN NATIVE TITLE
CLAIMS
There is a longstanding Western cultural tradition
of maintaining a binary opposition between orality
and literacy. The distinction between writing as
civilised and orality as primitive has been used to
justify the hierarchical relationship between the
coloniser and the colonised.31 As Jacques Derrida
argues:
The continued use of the oral/written
distinction is always haunted by the
underlying racist distinctions of the colonial
project.32
In Of Grammatology, Derrida posits that the Western
worlds obsession with the Truth explains why
texts or written accounts have been associated with
being more reliable and trustworthy because they
are perceived to be more stable, ongoing and
unchanging and hence closer to the Truth than oral
accounts. This metaphysical framework that the
truth and absolute knowledge is out there waiting
to be discovered also lies at the heart of the Western
legal system and explains why judges have
ambivalent feelings when they are confronted with
oral evidence.33
The worlds leading case on the admission and
interpretation of oral history of First Nations as
evidence remains Delgamuukw v. British Colombia.34
Despite the oral testimony given by the elder Johnny
David in the Delgamuukw hearings, Chief Justice
McEachern gave little weight to the evidence of the
hereditary chiefs. As illustrated hereafter with some
extracts from the court hearings, the Chief Justice
struggled with the cross-cultural barriers and hence
in his rules of evidence rejected oral testimonies.
Later, the Supreme Court of Canada overturned
much of the trial judgment and accepted oral history
as evidence in its judgment. Nevertheless this
overturning of the initial judgment, Delgamuukw I,35
remains illustrative in highlighting the problems
associated with cross-cultural communication and
translation of colliding worldviews in native title
claims.
One of the striking examples in the Delgamuukw I
case is the difference between the concept of hearsay
in Western jurisprudence and the understanding of
what one is empowered to talk about. In Witsuwiten
culture one can give valid testimony about events
that were not witnessed but that were passed down
through stories as long as one has the authority to
talk about these events. However, in Western
jurisprudence, events that were not witnessed are
reduced to hearsays and other witnesses or written
accounts need to be produced in order to validate
the particular event.36
Even more telling was the status given to oral
traditions. A defining moment in the Delgamuukw
case is when Johnny gives evidence about Tas Dleese,
the story of the monster at Dzikins Lake which in
the cultural tradition of the Witsuwiten is an
important story that can support evidence for
establishing historical rights to territory. However,
for Judge McEachern, the story was reduced to an
unreliable myth and he dismissed the importance
of these myths to First Nations as valid and
sacrosanct validations of rights to land.37
Even though the Supreme Court of Canada
eventually accepted the oral history of First Nations
as evidence in native title claims in Delgamuukw III38
and Mitchell v. M.N.R.39, Canadian courts kept
struggling with the relevance they should attribute
Paradox of Narratives: Nagoya Protocol and Customary Law
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31 Drew Mildon, A Bad Connection: First Nations Oral
Histories in the Canadian Courts, in Renée Hulan and
Renate Eigenbrod eds, Aboriginal Oral Traditions: Theory,
Practice and Ethics 79 (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing,
2008).
32 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology 101 (Baltimore: John
Hopkins Press, 1976) quoted in Mildon, Id., at 80.
33 See Mildon, note 31 above.
34 Antonia Mills, Hang on to these Words: Johnny Davids
Delgamuukw Evidence (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2005).
35 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, (1991) 79 D.L.R. (4th)
185 (B.C.S.C.).
36 See Mills, note 34 above.
37 Id.
38 See Delgamuukw note 27 above.
39 Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R 911, 2001 SCC 33, para 27.
to oral evidence. The ambivalent positioning of the
courts towards oral evidence has become a main
hurdle for First Nations in their quest to gain
recognition of their rights, mainly because oral
histories are accessed and used in a transcribed and
prescribed written form  the mainstream historical
discourse.40 As a result, the stories of indigenous
peoples get lost in the shuffle of legal formalities.41
Borrows42 draws attention to another challenge that
is posed by accepting oral histories as evidence in
native title claims. The oral evidence of indigenous
peoples in the courts has multiple purposes and
besides providing historical facts, the stories of
indigenous peoples often question at the core the
nation states legal and constitutional structure.
[Aboriginal peoples] evidence records the
facts that the unjust extension of the common
law and constitutional regimes often
occurred through dishonesty and deception,
and that the loss of Aboriginal land and
jurisdiction happened against their will and
without their consent.43
In other words, oral traditions can question the
legitimacy of the law. This makes it even more
difficult for the court to accept the oral stories of
indigenous peoples as a full expression of their
suppressed voice. Courts are faced with a dilemma.
They can either accept the stories of indigenous
peoples highlighting the laws illegitimacy or impose
a legal language that distorts or hides the full
expression of the voice of indigenous peoples. For
Vermette, the coloniser has still a monopoly over
interpretation; the legal system lies at the heart of
the anti-dialogical action of the oppressor.44 The
reluctance of the courts to interpret the social
meanings of the presented oral histories in a correct
way has led to a questioning of the legitimacy of the
law and its dominant forces.
Law, Environment and Development Journal
The dominant legal system rapes its way into
legitimacy, and took form as law, based upon
the right of its military attire and its ability
through force to dominate all that is different
or fails to conform to those who hold power.
This is now law. Law is rooted in creation, it
is a song, it is a love of law, and its land and
its peoples. This muldarbi law works to erase
peoples and their law.45
Looking at some of the transcripts of the
Delgamuukw I court hearings in Mills46 reminds the
author of Bentons critique of how colonial powers
have sent messages through legal institutions that
were simply not received.47 Benton illustrates this
with an extract from Achebes novel on colonialism,
Things Fall Apart.48 The protagonist, Okonkwo, is
taken before the judge and jury, and convicted,
without realising what is happening. He is not awed
by the event because he does not know it is a trial.
He does not know that the presiding British official
is a judge; he does not know that the twelve men
brought in to listen to the exchanges in the room
compromise a jury. For Benton this passage in the
novel epitomises the burden of translation when
the coloniser and the colonised are encountering
each other:
Individuals and groups were identified right
away to act as interlocutors or intermediaries.
While cultural change reverberated through
interacting societies, it was concentrated in
the cultural transformation of these
individuals. Within a historically short space
of time we observe cultural practices that are
products of neither dominant nor
subordinate cultures, but of the interaction.49
Narratives and stories are told in specific settings
for specific purposes and a story told at different
times and different settings may present different
193
40 See Mildon, note 31 above and Preston, note 13 above.
41 Darcy Vermette, Colonialism and the Suppression of
Aboriginal Voices 40 Ottawa Law Review 225 (2008-
2009).
42 John Borrows, Listening for Change: the Courts and
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selves and different histories. Stories are told in a
situation of a transforming relationship between the
elicitor and the narrator; they form part of a
communicative interaction and exchange between
the listener and the narrator each with their own
agendas.50 Ultimately, as illustrated above with
Johnnys oral testimony in the Delgamuukw I case,
the use of language in law is a communicative action
and the success of the action depends on whether
the hearer (in this case the judge) responds to the
validity claims raised by the speaker.51 Oral history
is dialectic; the outcome of the story relies on the
experience and interpretation of both the teller and
the listener.52
Oral history is by definition subjective,53 and
indigenous peoples particularly value the subjective
interpretation of history because it allows the teller
to link the past with the present. Oral history is more
than just a description of events or the quest to find
the truth; oral history accommodates the fluid
aspects of culture and tradition, it is about
discovering social processes and understanding
current problems through narratives.54 The histories
of indigenous peoples are often steeped in myths and
legends; genres that sit uncomfortable within the
mainstream. When encountered in courts, oral
traditions will be transcribed or translated. It seems
that the only way oral histories can find a place in
history is through these translations. However,
translating oral histories into written ones devalues
their symbolism and meaning. Oral histories can
only become legitimate by distorting the subjectivity
of these narratives. Regardless of whether oral stories
are recognised as legitimate testimonials in court
hearings, by translating narratives into the
mainstream, they continue to be marginalised55 and
aboriginal legal arguments are reinterpreted so they
fall within Western legal concepts.56 For Borrows
this amounts to a practice that has made aboriginal
peoples legally different and makes them live in
tenuous legal conditions.57 The Victor Buffalo58
case, which was one of the first major Treaty cases
after Delgamuukw, made it clear that the latter
instead of settling the debate had only intensified
the battle over oral history evidence in Canadian
courtrooms.59
Just as Canada has been struggling with the status of
oral histories in its law courts, so has South Africa
in the Land Claims Courts. After the collapse of the
apartheid regime, the demand for justice required
the law to bend its rules and hearsay oral evidence
had to be admitted as legitimised evidence in Land
Claims Courts. This has raised questions as to what
extent oral evidence can be a record and how this
record can be alternatively stored or archived. For
Harris, the recording of narrative and the archiving
of orality can easily destroy the fluidity of the
narrative and can alienate the teller from the story.
There are similarities between the legal status of oral
histories in the courts of law and the societal
processes behind archival theory.60 The need to
archive or to record oral stories as legal evidence
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reinforces the voicelessness of the marginalised.
The archive becomes the terrain of power and
history is littered with examples of archives that are
used to manipulate social memory.61
5
THE FOUNDING MOMENT OF LAW
The reluctance of the courts to embrace fully and
whole heartedly the concept of customary law as
evidence in native title claims is forcing us to re-
evaluate the concept of law in a culturally diverse
plural society. The rejection of myths as oral
evidence is an example of a belief that the law
remains temporally and spatially deferred, a
phenomenon that can be illustrated with an extract
from Kafkas story Before the Law.
Before the law stands a doorkeeper. To the
doorkeeper there comes a man from the
country who begs admittance to the Law. But
the doorkeeper says that he cannot admit the
man at the moment. The man, on reflection,
asks if he will be allowed, then, to enter later.
It is Possible, answers the doorkeeper, but
not at the moment.62
A popular reading of this story is that the law is
before the peasant but it is not present; it forever
recedes to some other place and time.63 Unless an
institution can be duplicated it cannot have meaning
in different contexts, and it is this very replication
that opens it up to the possibility of change. In order
for the law to be enforceable, it must be repeatable,
but because the law is repeatable it is haunted by a
paradox. In order to provide itself with a foundation
and remain law, the law invokes self-evident truths,
God or appeals to natural law. But to quote Sokoloff,
the paradox is that the founding moment of the law
is itself unfounded.64 The laws institutional
response to the paradox brought about by the
iterability is to try and ensure that it is provided
with a univocal interpretation that is received
uniformly. This requires an examination of how to
make the transition from a concept of law that is
regarded as homogenous and universal despite
prevailing diversities, to a postmodern conception
that is reflective of its cultural diversity. In order to
make this transition it is important to reflect further
upon the founding moment of law.
The history of the rise of positive law can be told in
different ways and the history we are probably most
familiar with dates back to the Normans who
initiated the process of moulding the chthonic
British laws into state-centred, official law. A key
role in forging this centralising of law was acquired
by lawyers and judges. Englands capacity for
gradually absorbing various components into its
national legal order through the activities of lawyers
has made its history distinct from its continental
European counterparts who sought refuge in
Roman-inspired codification as the preferred means
of consolidating their state systems into some sort
of unity.65 This has made the common law tradition
remarkably distinct from the Napoleonic legal
tradition and has led some commentators to argue
that common law has more potential to respond to
the demands of an ethnically plural social base.
However, common law is itself sharply conditioned
by culturally defining elements, and acts as a
culturally homogenising institution. As Shah argues:
The balance between the chthonic and the
lawyers laws gradually shifted over time so
that the history of the common law came to
be largely written as one of judicial decisions
that are nationally applicable rather than as
analyses of the laws of various British
peoples. By the 20th Century, local custom
retained only a marginal status as a source
for the common law [] the ethno-cratic and
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of the history of the mixed jury is the principle of
personal law which sets out that the judgment of a
person must be according to the law or customs of
that persons community; such judgment must be
made by those with knowledge of those customs or
by those who share in those customs and belong to
the same community. When communities
increasingly encountered the king and the law of
the state after the 14th century, the history of the
official doctrine of the mixed jury, as distinct from
the tradition of its practice, began. Rather than the
traditional merging of two laws, the state gradually
declared itself the source of law, and as it did so, the
unity of tradition and practice broke apart. In other
words, the history of the mixed jury is the story of
the rise of official law and the decline of practice.
But within the context of this article, the history of
the mixed jury also draws attention to the founding
moment of the law, namely that the positivist
understanding of the law precludes the possibility
of any law other than positive law. Anglo-American
legal historians view communities governed by
custom as somehow non- or pre-legal. English
common law is official law, the law of the kings
courts, rather than custom. The kings laws
developed against a background of local custom and
through the centralisation of royal power developed
into a particular system of rules, with their own
rational coherence.70 As Plucknett71 argues, law
consists in rules laid down by judicial or legislative
authority, custom is not quite the same as law.
Custom, so argues Whitelock,72 lacks the judicial
machinery and procedure required for the
production of law. In distinguishing custom from
law, the positivist conception of law is sealed,
granting primacy to the law of officials in their
understanding of law as a system of prepositional
rules. For Hart,73 the defining moment of law or
the origin of positive law is rooted in conquest,
techno-cratic elements of the British legal
order therefore appear to combine in
suppressing the influence of other
traditions.66
This becomes even more obvious when we examine
the foundation of the law through the history of
the mixed jury. This is a history that shows so aptly
how we moderns approach citizenship, law and
knowledge through positivism. As Constable argues:
The story of the mixed jury, from its pre-
statutory practice to its statutory abolition
in 1870, is, in microcosm, a history of the
rise of positive law. It tells of the emergence
of a world in which the law of officials
assumes exclusive standing as law, in which
the territorial jurisdiction of a state replaces
the principle of personality of law (that one
lives and judged according to ones own law),
in which social science transforms the
practices of a people into prepositional
knowledges of norms, and in which laws
become an instrument of social policy
directed towards the management of a
population.67
In early examples of pre-14th century mixed juries,68
strangers or members of other communities together
with the natives of those who stood trial, reached a
conciliation of the customs of two communities.
Early juries embody a principle of personal law,
whereby both non-alien and alien persons are
entitled to be judged secondum legum quam vivit 
or literally according to the law by which one lives
or indeed by the customs of the community to which
the person belongs. With the development of the
nation-state, the alien members of a jury come to be
the alien partys fellow citizens; in other words the
laws of the state govern those who reside within the
states geographical boundaries, regardless of the
customs of the community to which a person
belongs. According to Constable,69 the significance
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meaning that understanding law only as positive law
is an act that commits society to a law that is founded
on conquest or force of will. The moment of origin
of positive law coincides with the moment a
conqueror imposes his will on a conquered
people.74
6
EXCLUSIONS FROM LAW AND THE
NAGOYA PROTOCOL: A THEORETICAL
UNDERSTANDING
As established above, it is undeniable that laws
identity lies in its positivity. However, law also gains
its identity from processes of exclusion.75 If the
concept of exclusion is firmly embedded in laws
identity, it is important to gain a better
understanding of how the law draws the line
between inclusion and exclusion. Davies76 explains
this process of exclusion from two theoretical
viewpoints: a structural/post-structuralist theory of
meaning and psychoanalysis.
According to structural theory, exclusion, expressed
through difference, is an essential component of
identity. Thus, differentiating oneself from others
forms ones identity. This principle translates itself
in the legal domain as the identity of law being
defined by excluding various non-legal phenomena.
However, from a post-structural point of view,
exclusion is not only formative of identity, it is also
subversive of identity. Because identity is constituted
by exclusion, from a post-structuralist perspective,
identity is also threatened by exclusion. Exclusion
antagonises, undermines and resists laws identity.77
As this article has illustrated above, only certain
expressions of difference are recognised in native title
claims in order to protect the positivist identity of
law. However, indigenous peoples have used their
culturally embedded legal expressions and evidence
in the courts  narratives that are indeed initially
excluded from the law on the basis of being non-
legal phenomena  as a way to question laws identity
and its representation in a uniform, sovereign,
positivist structure. In other words, from a post-
structural perspective, while exclusion initially seems
to protect the identity of law, given the subversive
nature of identity, exclusion also undermines and
threatens the identity of law.
Another way Davies theorises about exclusion in
the law is through the psychoanalytical distinction
between foreclosure and repression.
Foreclosure refers to total exile or
repudiation; the foreclosed object is alien or
outlawed, completely exterior and beyond
the comprehension of the foreclosing entity.
In contrast, repression is an internal denial
or act of censure. In the case of foreclosure
the thing does not exist or cannot be seen,
whereas a repressed entity may be recognised,
perhaps tangentially, but is condemned or
resisted.78
This distinction between foreclosure and repression
offers a useful critical lens to further analyse the
relationship between Euro-American and indigenous
law. To reiterate, the Nagoya Protocol recognises,
in Article 12 (1), customary law and community
protocols. While the CBDs positioning towards
customary law was still vague and unclear, the
Nagoya Protocol seems to have included customary
law as formal law. In other words, as a result of
socio-political and cultural pressure, the exclusion
of indigenous or customary law from the formal
body of law has become untenable and as such the
foreclosure of customary law has become difficult
to uphold in international fora such as the CBD.
For a long time, Western state law protected its
identity through the exclusion of customary law
from the definition of law. The object law could
only maintain its position as a unified
institutionalised normative system by excluding
other systems of law which were characterised as
non-law. However, as this article has argued above,
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the idea that the law is a uniform normative
institution cannot be maintained because the
underlying philosophical ideas and norms that justify
this distinction between inside and outside or
between law and non-law have been criticised both
by critical theories and emancipatory praxis.
The location of the line of exclusion is
inevitably set by political and cultural
considerations and in the contemporary
context, recognition of a plurality of laws and
concepts of law may both be normatively
(ethically) preferable and empirically
defensible. [] Thus, the idea of an exclusive
law defined by a clear inside/outside
dichotomy has suffered several theoretical
blows.79
Thus, a plurality of concepts of the law seems to be
a newly accepted norm from a legal philosophical
point of view. However, from the point of view of
the law as a subject, the issue of exclusion seems to
be more problematic and more difficult to challenge.
By drawing upon Freuds concept of repression, it
becomes obvious that the law might consider its
subjects as equally existing under the law, but the
law might not equally recognise their subjectivity.
This type of exclusion is more subtle and is a form
of internal exclusion which takes the form of
silencing the subject who does not fit the
predetermined legal stereotype.80 To use Davies
words:
[I]t is possible to be included in a category
while still being excluded  one can be
included formally and literally, yet still be
disempowered, marginalised, silenced and in
practice disenfranchised.81
While a total exclusion from the law has been
rectified and customary law has become part of
formal law, a repressed exclusion from the law
becomes more difficult to challenge because the
subject is already formally included in the law but
at the same time stays excluded.
The person who is formally recognised as an
equal legal subject, but poorly recognised in
the symbolic, discursive, or representational
spheres of law, is not wholly a legal outsider,
but encounters resistance in their interactions
with law.82
Referring back to the previous section of this article
wherein the oral narratives of indigenous peoples as
evidence in native title court cases are problematised,
it becomes obvious to conclude that customary law,
as expressed in narratives, finds itself in that
repressed space of exclusion. This means that despite
the acceptance of customary law as law, in praxis,
customary law is still excluded because the laws
identity remains to be based on exclusion or indeed
repression because the subjects of the law, in this
case indigenous peoples, remain excluded from the
social domain.
While the Nagoya Protocol under the auspices of
the CBD represents a major step forward in the
recognition of the self-determination rights of
indigenous peoples, from both a theoretical and
empirical point of view, doubts must be raised as to
what extent the Nagoya Protocol has become a legal
instrument that is based on inclusion rather than
exclusion. At this point it is useful to remind the
reader again that, as this article has argued elsewhere,
the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement has turned the
Sans knowledge and culture into property.
The uses and meaning of Hoodia in the Sans culture
became defined and directed by law. Law, through
the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement, excluded
alternative narratives. Only those San voices that
were willing to commodify Hoodia were represented
in the agreement. Dissident voices that were
contesting the benefit sharing agreement were
excluded. Often the dissident voices belonged to the
most marginalised members of the community. Just
like in native title claims, San narratives were used
to subvert laws identity. Some of the stories that
the author of this article has recorded in the field
were not only narrated within the spirit to contest
the Hoodia benefit sharing agreement but also to
undermine the fetishism of exclusive property rights.
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The legal regime that has been created with access
and benefit sharing agreements has been one that
sits uncomfortable with some San peoples who do
not believe in the value of protecting their
biocultural rights through a property rights
framework. Instead, they have resorted to some of
their older narratives about food sharing between
the hyena, jackal and lion to show that the social
organisation of the San or indeed their law is not
based on a regime of exclusive property rights but
on an ethos of sharing and reciprocity.
The Hoodia benefit sharing agreement is an example
of repressed exclusion. While in principle the law
accepts customary law, de facto, the law still struggles
to accept alternative narratives. Hoodia as a
commodified property is protected through the
benefit sharing agreement under the auspices of the
CBD, but Hoodia as a life force that is a part of the
Sans wider cosmologies has been excluded from that
protection. It is a narrative that remains muted and
confined to the Kalahari sand dunes because its
narrators are not the ones who have the power in
the community to make their voice heard.
In short, from a theoretical and empirical perspective,
the evidence is there to fear that the Nagoya Protocol
will be a legal tool that is based on exclusion because
the laws identity is based on a network of exclusions.
Together with other critical legal thinkers, the author
of this article argues that for customary law to become
part of the law, the law as a concept needs to be
challenged. It is not sufficient to pay lip service to
customary law in the Nagoya Protocol as long as the
laws identity remains unchallenged. The idea of the
law needs to be reinvented. One way of reimaging
law is to conceptualise it as a non-identity. The best
way to do this is through a framework of pluralism.
Pluralism is the position that there is no single
concept of law, law is multiple and
heterogeneous in any community and cannot
be reduced to a single identity.
Seeing the law as a heterogeneous non-identity opens
up the possibility to think about the law as a practice
of inclusion rather than exclusion. It allows for the
law to be conceptualised as something that is
inherently pluralistic.
Law, Environment and Development Journal
199
7
CONCLUSION: A RETURN TO
LEGAL PLURALISM
Within this context of legal pluralism, this article
finds it particularly interesting to pursue further the
idea of Chiba83 that legal pluralism is about the law
in conflict and the law in subjectivity. Modern
jurisprudence, he argues, excludes this personal
factor because of its emphasis on the law in
objectivity. He continues:
The essential importance of the subjective
perspective is that a person under legal
pluralism is not only a passive recipient of
legal regulation but also an active agent for
the law by his/her choice of an alternative
legal rule among the plural. The choice is
made to support one of the plural standards
and to reject the other ones.84
In other words, for Chiba, legal pluralism makes it
possible for individuals to become agents of change
when making culturally dependent subjective
choices and as such legal pluralism allows developing
conflict situations. A central point in Chibas
argument is that it is essential to observe conflicts
within legal pluralism. How does this translate
within the context of this article and the recognition
of the legal system of indigenous peoples?
Berman85 argues that communities react to legal
pluralism or complex overlapping legal authorities
by either re-imposing the primacy of territory-based
authority or seeking universal harmonisation; both
strategies are indeed familiar practices for indigenous
groups. For Berman neither sovereign territorialism
nor universal harmonisation can respond
successfully to the hybridisation of the law and he
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Press, 1989). See also Shah, note 65 above.
84 Id., at 239.
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argues, instead, that the descriptive insights of legal
pluralism call for deliberately seeking to create or
preserve spaces for conflict among multiple,
overlapping legal systems. People may never acquire
agreement on norms but they may acquire
agreement on procedural mechanisms, institutions
or practices that take hybridity seriously, rather than
ignoring it through assertions of sovereignty or
dissolving it through universalist imperatives.
What might make the legal establishment (including
courts) uncomfortable with Bermans plea for
pluralism is that a pluralist approach will not provide
an authoritative metric for determining whose
norms prevail in this messy hybrid world, nor does
it answer the question of who gets to decide. What
pluralism does is to challenge fundamentally both
positivist and natural rights-based assumptions that
there can ever be a single answer to a question. It
might be a rather unwelcome message, but drawing
on the authors experience with the San peoples and
the Hoodia case, there is some value in Bermans
statement. Any definitive statement as to who is
authorised to make decisions is itself inevitably open
to contestation by others. A pluralist framework
suggests a future research agenda that emphasises
micro-interactions among different legal or
normative systems, applying pluralism to the
international arena of cultural property rights
illuminates a broader field of enquiry than asking
whose norms prevail but instead asks scholars to
consider studying in more depth the processes
whereby normative gaps among communities are
negotiated.
What makes the concept of legal pluralism
particularly interesting in the context of the Nagoya
Protocol is that it offers possibilities for thinking
about spaces of resistance to state law or official law
because it examines the limits to the ideological
power of state law, but pluralism also frees the law
from an essentialist definition. The debate about law
and non-law, official law and non-official law or
common or customary law is largely irrelevant
because the key questions involve the normative
commitments of a community and the interactions
among normative orders that give rise to such
commitments, not their formal status. Legal
pluralists refuse to focus solely on who has the
formal authority to articulate norms or the power
to enforce them; instead, they aim to study
empirically which statements of authority tend to
be treated as binding in actual practice and by whom.
This is the point where legal pluralism still has to
fight its own challenges because as indigenous groups
know all too well, political and economic power
strongly affect how much influence any particular
normative community is likely to have. However,
by broadening the scope of what counts as binding
law without having to engage with an endless debate,
the international community can turn its attention
to examine how best to mediate the hybrid spaces
where normative systems and communities overlap
and clash. Nevertheless there remains the challenge
for indigenous peoples to accept the principles of
procedural pluralism itself which are consonant with
liberal principles and may reject it on that basis.
To conclude, oral histories in the context of the
stories of indigenous peoples are more than just
archives, they serve other social purposes such as
communicating cultural traditions. If the law and
the courts are serious about accepting oral histories
as evidence, first and foremost the use of these stories
must shift from providing factual evidence towards
the context of the social production of these stories.
As long as courts translate stories into facts we must
raise doubts whether the courts and the law are up
for translating and incorporating symbols in a
meaningful way that can protect indigenous peoples
from further subordination from the continued
colonial practice of the law.
As Fitzpatrick86 argues, accounts of myth in
Western scholarship are presented as characteristics
of the non-Western others and the pre-modern West.
If we as an international community of critical
scholars want to tackle the problem of how to
embrace non-Western framings of law, we have to
confront the supposed absence of myth in
modernity. The birth of the rational man and
modern law are indeed just as mythical; the portrayal
of the lawless nature of the savage has been used to
justify the need for rationality and universality, but
these concepts are just as mythical as the savages
supposed irrationality and bestiality. Instead of
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exoticising the other, the law needs to decolonise
internally, only by exotising its own myths can it
de-exotise the other. Judging from the progress that
has been made in native title claims on this issue,
unfortunately, indigenous peoples will still
empathise with Kafkas peasant in his story Before
the Law.87 Before the CBD stands a doorkeeper: To
the doorkeeper there comes a man from the Kalahari
who begs admittance to the CBD. But the
doorkeeper says that he cannot admit the man at
the moment. The man, on reflection, asks if he will
be allowed, then, to enter later. It is possible,
answers the doorkeeper, but not at the moment.
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